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Abstract. Vorukh is a Tajik enclave in Kyrgyzstan and a point of a serious interstate conflict with unpredictable consequences. Apart from Vorukh itself, the conflict affects the nearby territories along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. The growing tension is partly due to the incomplete demarcation of the borders of the disputed areas. Their history goes back to the Soviet past, on which opponents base their territorial claims. Tajik experts mainly relies on documentary sources of the initial period of national and territorial demarcation in Soviet Central Asia (1924–1928), while their Kyrgyz colleagues – on post-war agreements and maps that fixed the actual border lines, dating mainly from the second half of the 1950s. Based on their sources, Tajik experts conclude that Vorukh was not originally an enclave; moreover, in recent years, they have been trying to prove that it is not an enclave even now. Their Kyrgyz counterparts, on the other hand, unreasonably insist that since modern Vorukh has all the classic attributes of an enclave, it has always been one. The article discusses historical events and documents related to the processes of border formation in the Fergana Valley during the pre-war decade. Experts usually refer to them in passing, mentioning only those maps and fragmentary facts that are in line with their beliefs. The history of resolving border issues during this period is becoming more and more relevant as mutual territorial claims of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan extend. [1] After studying expert assessments and available documents, it has been concluded that Vorukh in the pre-war period, just like before that, was connected to the “mother territory” by a strip of land and therefore was not a Tajik enclave on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.

In September 2022, there were unprecedented clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Regular troops, as well as units of various law enforcement agencies and local militia, took part in the confrontation on both sides. During the most intense fighting
between September 14 and 19, hundreds of people were killed or wounded and thousands were evacuated. Serious damage was done to villages and economic infrastructures. This happened for the first time in modern Central Asia. The main battles took place in the vicinity of the Tajik enclave of Vorukh [2] in Kyrgyzstan and in the cross-border areas. The conflict in the Fergana Valley has protracted for decades. Economic disputes (usually over water, land and roads) often escalated into clashes between local Kyrgyz and Tajiks. Sometimes there were exchanges of gunfire, mostly with the use of hunting rifles; people were wounded and killed, houses and outbuildings burned. In the post-Soviet period, border guards of both independent states began to take part in skirmishes more often. In recent years, both states has pulled military equipment to the border and erected echeloned fortifications. Local conflicts involving the locals and military were growing more frequent and becoming more violent. At the same time, the authorities of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan did their best to avoid voicing their interstate confrontation, insisting that the tensions were purely technical in nature and related to the demarcation process. However, the circumstances were such that a serious armed conflict broke out between the two neighbouring states, which can hardly be considered an accident. There were explosive destabilizing factors of natural and artificial origins aplenty. All it took was setting fire to the fuse, either intentionally or unwittingly.

Serious tensions continue, in part, due to the unsettled issues of establishing the boundaries in some lowland and foothill areas between the two states. As of early 2023, out of 972 km of the shared border between the countries, 682 km were set and agreed upon, while 290 km remain disputed. [3] It is impossible to draw demarcation lines in about 70 areas, for the most part in the nearby territories of the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan and the Sughd region of Tajikistan. Technically, it is extremely complicated to set the borders due to the fact that there are frequent strips of Kyrgyz and Tajik settlements and agricultural
plots in these densely populated areas. Borders often run along streets, sometimes even weaving between buildings in a checkerboard pattern. They can cross roads, fields, pastures, rivers and streams several times over.

Moreover, the situation is complicated by the fact that when defining the borders, both sides refer to all sorts of documents and historical events that exclusively support their claims. Tajik experts mainly rely on documentary sources of the initial period of the national and territorial delimitation of Soviet Central Asia, while their Kyrgyz colleagues turn to agreements, decrees and maps that set the actual border lines during the post-war period, starting from the second half of the 1950s. Furthermore, they often appeal to the conflicting rules and international law cases on establishing the boundaries. These references allow for each party to define the status of Vorukh as they will, making it a sticking point of the Kyrgyz-Tajik conflict. Recently, the positions of the parties have been drastically diverged. Some say that it is and has always been an enclave; others claim that it was never an enclave in the first place, since the lands that connected it with the “mother territory” were illegally seized.

Tajik experts rely on archival documents of 1924–1929 and some later ones, contending that Vorukh was not an enclave during the formation of Soviet rule. At first part of the Uzbek SSR, this territory was wedged into the lands of Kyrgyzstan [4] and connected to the main part of Uzbekistan by a continuous strip of land. Subsequently, in 1929, the Tajik SSR emerged from the Uzbek SSR. Vorukh became part of the newly established republic and was directly connected to the “mother territory”. It should be noted that the vast majority of state documents of the initial Soviet period – treaties and resolutions regarding the demarcation of the borders – were actually legislations, ratified by the republics and the Union Centre. It is important to remember that it was at that time that the key decisions on the structure of the Central Asian republics were made; major
present borders are still the same. In the first part of the article, an attempt to study the most significant decisions on the demarcation is made; the article also discusses modern estimates of these decisions. It concludes that Vorukh was not an enclave during the initial delimitation of the state borders of the Soviet republics of Central Asia. [5]

For the most part, borders between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and then between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, were fixed between 1924 and 1929. It was a turbulent time of unprecedented revolutionary achievements in spite of the resistance of strong traditional ideas and practices. Now the Soviet authorities are usually blamed for the unfair demarcation of the Central Asian borders, although an objective assessment of these processes has yet to be given. How to draw fair boundaries across a mosaic of territories inhabited by an ethnically diverse (or sometimes ethnically indefinite) population remains an open question. [6]

The period of active redrawing of borders that was mainly associated with the emerging of ethnocentric formations was over by the start of the first five-year plan (1928–1932). In 1927, the Kremlin strongly recommended that the Central Asian comrades should cease bringing mutual claims over disputed territories that were based solely on ethno-national principle. [7] The focus was on economic expediency. [8] It was time of epoch-making social and economic achievements. The Soviet Union had to promptly boost its military and economic power. During tense pre-war, war and post-war years, shifting of borders in the region due to ethno-national unity was considered irrelevant. Rare exceptions were made for purely economic reasons. Thus, in 1927, at the request of the Kyrgyz side – and possibly at the initiative of the State Planning Committee – the coal mines of Sulukta along with the village and adjacent lands were transferred from the Uzbek SSR to the Kyrgyz Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic. In 1928, the Sulukta District was formed within the Isfana and Batken-Bujum volosts. Carts loaded with
Sulukta coal were brought to the regional centre of Proletarsk in Tajikistan, reloaded into wagons, and then distributed throughout the Soviet Union. All necessary equipment for the miners was delivered back to Sulukta. [9] In the same year, the neighbouring settlements of Samarkandek and Üch-Korgon were transferred from the Uzbek SSR to the Kyrgyz ASSR, while the village of Jigdalik was transferred to Uzbekistan. At the same time, the Karkara yaylak, a vast pasture near Issyk-Kul, was transferred from Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan.

With the beginning of the first five-year plan, the mass collectivization was launched in the countryside. In Kyrgyzstan, it also meant transition of nomadic and semi-nomadic households to settled way of life. Within a short period of time, tens of thousands people had to switch to a new type of management. [10] Settled nomads needed fertile lands with irrigation systems, which were in short supply. [11] Naturally, the unresolved ethno-territorial disputes were brought to the forth.

Despite some shifting of the borders in 1927–1928, the Kyrgyz side still felt slighted. After a three-year moratorium on filing territorial claims ended, the leadership of Kyrgyzstan reminded the Centre about unresolved territorial issues. In 1931, Abdukadyr Urazbekov, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Kyrgyz ASSR, prepared a memo on the borders between the Kyrgyz ASSR and neighbouring republics; it was addressed to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Central Asian Economic Council. [12] It contained a detailed and rather extensive list of the territories and settlements in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, to which Kyrgyzstan laid claim; the case for revising the borders was built on interconnected facts of an ethnic, national, economic, and geographical nature. At the same time, the document drew attention to territorial concessions, made by Kyrgyzstan in favour of neighbouring republics during the national and territorial delimitation. In essence, with this memo, Kyrgyzstan appealed to
the central authorities of the Soviet Union for resolving the land disputes that had accumulated over six years in its favour.

The document emphasized that hundreds of square kilometres of Uzbek lands were wedged into the regions of Kyrgyz ASSR, in particular:

- “The narrow strip of land of several hundred square kilometres that belongs to Uzbek SSR and is located near the upper and middle reaches of the Isfara River, wedges into the territory of the Sulukta District of Kyrgyz ASSR and divides it into two parts – eastern and western – thereby complicating communication within the district and services for the population.” (Author’s note: Most likely, this is a reference to Vorukh, which from 1929 belonged to the Tajik SSR.) [13]

- Similar territory of Uzbek SSR is wedged into Kyrgyz ASSR between the Sulukta and Kyzyl-Kyya regions. (Author’s note: Apparently, it is Sokh and, possibly, Shohimardon.) [13]

- The villages of the Tajik SSR – Khtai, Andersai, Ak- Tube, Kotur, etc. – and the adjacent lands cut into Kyrgyz ASSR in the Sulukta region. [13]

Moscow reacted to the appeal of the CEC of the Kyrgyz ASSR with restrain. There were no significant boundary changes of Kyrgyzstan with neighbouring republics. However, the Centre took note of the remarks on the Sulukta region, and in 1932 the territories of Zamburuch village near Sulukta, a vast but sparsely populated area, was transferred from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan. It is possible that joining of this territory was due to the production needs to expand the industrial infrastructure of the Sulukta District and attract extra labour. [14]

That was the last significant change concerning borders of the Central Asian republics done by the central leadership of the USSR. During the subsequent pre-war years, there were mainly local boundary changes between neighbouring collective farms (kolkhoz) and districts, which could be settled at the level of heads of districts, rural councils (selsoviet) and collective farms. The lands were usually exchanged or leased. For instance, in 1937,
rainfed and irrigated mixed-use lands of the collective farms in the Batken District of the Kyrgyz SSR were exchanged for those of the Vorukh rural council in the Isfara District (the Kekh tract) of the Tajik SSR. The document was drawn up in the form of an act on the clarification of the borders in this area and provided a description of the lines of delimitation “in order to eliminate shortcomings of land use, such as strip farming and wedging.” The size and location of the exchanged territories were decided upon by land surveyors, chairmen of rural councils and collective farms on both sides; they also approved the agreement with their signatures. Land use within new boundaries became legal after Regional Committees of the republics authorized the act. [15] In roughly similar manner, land was transferred between neighbouring collective farms and regions of the Kyrgyz and Uzbek republics at the level of local conciliation commissions. [16]

From time to time, the Kyrgyz authorities attempted to change the borders of the republic “in order to eliminate wedging and strip farming” with the backing of the Centre. In particular, this is evidenced by Extract from the Minutes of the session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR on establishing the border between the Kyrgyz SSR and the Uzbek SSR along the Chanach-Sai River (1938). In the document, the Kyrgyz side urges “the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to form a government commission that will be tasked to finally resolve land disputes between the Kyrgyz SSR and the Uzbek SSR.” [17] However, there was a lack of understanding from Moscow.

Apparently, the leadership of Kyrgyzstan assumed that by its inaction, the Kremlin was giving the republics leave to make independent decisions on changing disputed border sections. In January 1940, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR Asanly Tolubaev [18] ratified Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR on the project of the border between Kyrgyz and Uzbek, Tajik SSR. [19] The document expresses the agreement of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Kyrgyz SSR with “the project of changing
borders between Kyrgyz and Uzbek, Tajik SSR”. Also, in order to “eliminate strip farming and wedging of the territories of one republic into those of another”, the authorities considered it necessary to transfer the villages of Surkh, Vorukh, Charka Matcha from Tajik SSR to the Kyrgyz SSR (highlighted by the author). In return, it was proposed to transfer he villages of Karabak (collective farm Karabak) and Ravat-Kaut (collective farm named after Ordzhonikidze) in the Batken region to Tajik SSR. Also, the Kyrgyz side expressed its readiness to transfer three collective farms in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions to Uzbek SSR in exchange for two dozen rural councils and collective farms along with their vast lands, located mainly around Sokh, Shohimardon, Ravon, Tul, Vodil and Xonobod. [20]

In August 1940, there was another document, not nearly as assertive as the previous ones. It concerned solely the issues of straightening the borders with Uzbek SSR and once again expressed the necessity for exchanging the same rural councils and collective farms. It should be noted that this time the initiative did not come directly from the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic, but rather from the administrative and territorial Commission under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR that in turn, referred to the appeal of the “executive committees of regional and district Soviets of People’s Deputies.” [21]

However, there was no straightening of the Kyrgyz-Tajik and Kyrgyz-Uzbek borders in the subsequent war and the post-war years. Vorukh remained part of the Tajik SSR and was connected to it by a strip of land. In this period, there were no major changes in the boundaries of the Uzbek wedgings and enclaves. [22]

In conclusion, judging by the changing reasons for moving the borders in the documents under consideration, there was a shift from ethnic and national justifications to economic ones. Before the war, the focus was on administrative and territorial issues, coupled with economic ones. It was time of active
delineation, consolidation and disaggregation of internal administrative and territorial units. Naturally, another redrawing of inter-republican borders did nothing to facilitate establishing proper management. Continued national and territorial demarcation was no longer in line with the general course and was most likely considered precarious. It should be mentioned that in the 1930s Soviet rule was increasingly threatened by pan-Turkism, which was also reflected on the way border issues were being handled.

Active shifting of some local borders between the Isfara and Batken regions started with the end of the Stalin era of building socialism, at the turn of the fifth five-year plan (1951–1955) and the sixth (1956–1960). However, this is another era and the history of Vorukh becoming an enclave will be recounted in Part 3 of this article.

References


2. Vorukh is a large Tajik settlement and an area of the same name that is located along the spurs of the Turkestan Range in Kyrgyzstan. Being part of the Isfara District in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, Jamoaт (rural community) Vorukh is surrounded on all sides by the administrative territories of the Kyrgyz Republic. Overall, it consists of three villages, Tidon, Maidon and Vorukh, which is the administrative centre. Villages are divided into mahallah (communities/neighborhoods); in total, there are up to 20 of them. According to various estimates, the area of the enclave is approximately 100 square kilometres, since it is impossible to accurately determine its size due to uncertainty of boundaries. Jamoaт has total population of approximately 33–35 thousand people. At least 95 percent of

4. Kyrgyzstan means the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region within the RSFSR.
6. It is well known that before the formation of the national republics many people from Central Asia were identified or self-identified by either their religion or place of residence (Fergana Valley, Namangan Region, etc.). Ethnogenesis of the Sarts is unclear. Source: R. Bobokhonov National and territorial delimitation and establishing of union republics in Central Asia (1924–1936). Part 2. [Electronic source] // Website “News Ivest”. URL: https://news.ivest.kz/89137166-nacionalno-territorialnoe-razmezhevanie-issozdanie-soyuznyh-republik-v-centralnoy-azii-1924-1936-gg-ch-2---r-bobohonov (accessed: 25.03.2023).
7. Apparently, by that time Moscow had understood that the flow of claims of the Central Asian comrades could be endless. It is possible that officials of the central apparatus were confused by their numerous proposals and complaints and had difficulty understanding the specifics of the region. One way or another, some territories were transferred back and forth between the republics multiple times. Within a few days, and even a day, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR could make diametrically opposite decisions, for example about Sokh and Isfara volosts. Source: Aziz Niyazi. Vorukh – the Territory of the Tajik-Kyrgyz Discord. On the Issue of the Initial Demarcation of the Soviet Period. Part 1 // Russia and the Moslem World, 2023. № 1 (319). P. 52–63.
8. Moscow most likely insisted on strict adherence to this principle even before that. As evidenced by a 1925 document, claims of a purely national character were supported by an economic reason. Thus, the demand of the Kyrgyz side that the Baksa-Sibirgen, Isfana and Chapkuluk volosts of the Khujand District of the Uzbek SSR should be transferred to the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region was justified, since 75.07 percent of the total population of these volosts were Kyrgyz. It was also noted that these areas, coupled with the Kyrgyz “Leylek and Naigutkipchak volosts, would make create an economically isolated region.” Source: Minutes of the meeting of the Subcommittee on clarifying the boundary of the Commission for zoning of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region on the inclusion of the Baksa-Sibirgen, Isfana and Chapkuluk volosts of the Khujand District into the Tashkent region, April 10, 1925 // Administrative and territorial division of Kyrgyzstan in documents of 1924–1945. Reference edition – Collection of papers. Ed. A. Bedelbaev. Bishkek. 2018. P. 18–20. P.S. In 1926, the Chapkuluk and Baksa-Isfana volosts were transferred to the Kyrgyz Autonomous Region within the RSFSR.


11. The shortage of these vital resources was revealed during the land and water reform in the south of Kyrgyzstan during 1927–1928.


13. At the end of the document, political and economic necessity for further demarcation was emphasized. The state of the borders between the Kyrgyz ASSR with neighbouring republics hampered smooth collectivization and management of collective farms because there is strip system of dehkan farms between the farmers of the Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Kazakh ASSR. For the same reasons, there were great difficulties in fulfilling sowing plans in general, since management and irrigation construction and such was complicated. Such border issues between Kyrgyzstan and neighbouring republics called for a complete review and clarification by exchanging territories from one republic to another, destruction of strip farming and establishment of a border in accordance with natural geographical features. Hence, the Central Committee of the Kyrgyz ASSR considered it necessary to immediately start clarifying the existing borders...” Source: Memorandum of the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Kyrgyz ASSR to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Central Asian Economic Council on the borders between the Kyrgyz ASSS and neighbouring republics. Frunze, May 29, 1931 // Administrative and territorial division of Kyrgyzstan in documents of 1924–1945. Reference edition – Collection of papers. Ed. A. Bedelbaev. Bishkek. 2018. P. 120–123. (TsGA KR, fund 1642, op. 11, file 1791, pages 29–31, copy).
The decision to transfer the lands of the Zamburuch rural council was made by the Central Union government in 1926, while the area was still part of the former Isfana volost of Uzbekistan. Now it is Ak-Suu ayyl aymagy (rural community) of the Leylek District in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. About 6000 people live there, mostly Kyrgyz. Old qishlaq names of the villages that passed to Kyrgyzstan in the 1930s almost have not lasted to the present day.


In 1943, A. Tolubaev was appointed chairman of the collective farm; was head of the rural council from 1947 to 1953. He died in 1962.

There is no information in the document as to which authority prepared the project. However, such work was usually done by the Administrative and Territorial Commission under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR.


As noted by the commission, “during the national delimitation of the republics of Central Asia, natural geographic boundaries were not established; as a result, there was a strip system farming by the Uzbek and Kyrgyz population. During collectivization, when assigning land to collective farms in accordance with state acts, the land use of the collective farms of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz SSR was merged. As a result, the collective farms of the Kyrgyz rural councils ended up on Uzbek territory and vice versa. The need for an exchange followed “in order to eliminate strip farming, wedging and interspersing, while at the same time establishing boundaries convenient for the best management of collective farms in terms of culture and economy and bringing the party and Soviet leadership closer to the population.” The paper further describes the territories and entities of exchange in detail. Minutes of the meeting of the Administrative and Territorial Commission under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz SSR on partial changes regarding borders between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz SSR. Frunze, August 12, 1940 // Administrative and territorial division of Kyrgyzstan in documents of 1924–1945. Reference edition – Collection of papers. Ed. A. Bedelbaev. Bishkek. 2018. P. 322-324; CGA KR. F. 1445. Op. 6. D. 12. L. 1, 2. Copy.

It was only very recently that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan came to an agreement to partially change problematic sections of the border. Compromises on land exchanges are closely linked to the use of water resources. Source: Oleg Kusov. Kyrgyz-Uzbek dialogue: it took countries 32 years to draw the state border. 27.01.2023. [Electronic source] // Website “News.ru”. URL: https://news.ru/cis/kirgizo-uzbekskij-dialog-na-provedenie-gosgranicy-u-stran-ushlo-32-goda/ (accessed: 20.03.2023).

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